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INTRODUCTION
T
his case note examines the radical change in the rule
against penalties in Cavendish Square Holding BV v
Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67 (Cavendish), a recent
decision of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom.
The rule against penalties is a contract law doctrine of
equitable origin which allows courts to render clauses unen-
forceable. We will refer to such clauses as ‘penalties’ or
‘penalty clauses’. The conclusion that a clause is a penalty
renders it void in its entirely (cf the position in Australia
which allows for partial enforcement: Andrews v ANZ Bank-
ing Group [2012] HCA 30, 247 CRL 205 (Andrews) at [10]).
The precise test for what makes a clause a penalty clause, and
the rationale for the rule, are uncertain. The question of
whether a clause is a penalty most commonly arises with
respect to clauses where a party who breaches a contract is
required to pay the innocent party a sum of money. Where
this sum is a genuine pre-estimate of the loss that the inno-
cent party would suffer from the breach, such a clause is a
“liquidated damages clause” and is enforceable. Tradition-
ally, penalties were distinguished from liquidated damages
clauses on the basis that the former deter and punish breach
while the latter merely compensate the innocent party. Cavend-
ish represents a significant departure from that approach.
The new approach in Cavendish follows from the Court’s
attempt to address deficiencies in previous formulations of
the rule against penalties, so we will survey the history of the
rule before setting out the new test. Beforehand, we will set
out the facts addressed in Cavendish that led to the new
formulation of the rule.
On the facts, the Court considered two different appeals,
Cavendish and ParkingEye. The Cavendish appeal con-
cerned the validity of two clauses in a large commercial
contract for the sale of a company that were triggered by
breach of contract by the seller. The first clause withheld
payments from the seller which he was otherwise due while
the second required the seller to sell his shares in the com-
pany to the purchaser. The ParkingEye case addressed the
validity of an £85 ‘parking charge’ levelled on customers
who overstayed a two-hour free parking period in a car park.
The Court concluded that none of the clauses it considered
were unenforceable (Lord Toulson dissented on the Parking
Eye appeal).
PREVIOUS FORMULATIONS OF THE RULE
The most influential case on the rule against penalties prior
to Cavendish was Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New
Garage and Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79. In Dunlop, the
Court considered a ‘price maintenance clause’ which pre-
vented a garage which sold Dunlop tyres and accessories
from undercutting the prices offered by Dunlop. It concluded
that this clause was not a penalty.
Lord Dunedin noted four tests (at 87, summarised at [21]
of Cavendish) to aid the Court in determining whether a
clause was penal. The first three tests are that a provision will
be penal if:
(a) “the sum stipulated for is extravagant and unconscio-
nable in amount in comparison with the greatest loss
that could conceivably be proved to have followed
from the breach”;
(b) the breach consisted only in the non-payment of money
and it provided for the payment of a larger sum; and
(c) the clause was a sum payable in a number of events of
varying gravity (this test is presumptive rather than
conclusive).
The fourth test is that a clause will not be penal by reason
only of the impossibility of precisely pre-estimating the true
loss. Lord Dunedin also famously stated at 86 that “[t]he
essence of a penalty is a payment of money stipulated as in
terrorem of the offending party; the essence of liquidated
damages is a genuine covenanted pre-estimation of damage”.
This captures the classic dichotomy between clauses that
deterred breach (unenforceable penalties) and clauses that
attempted to reflect the loss that the innocent party would
suffer (enforceable liquidated damages clauses).
In other, more recent cases, courts focused on the wider
question of whether there was a ‘commercial justification’
for the clause in question rather than simply whether the
clause provided a ‘genuine pre-estimate of loss’. However, as
in Dunlop, the test for whether a clause was penal was
framed with reference to a dichotomy between unenforce-
able clauses whose “dominant purpose was … to deter the
other party from breach” (Colman J in Lordsvale Finance plc
v Bank of Zambia [1996] QB 752 at 763–4), and enforceable
clauses that had purposes other than deterrence (even though
they may have had a significant deterrent effect). For example,
in Lordsvale the Court concluded that a clause that increased
the interest payable by a borrower in default was not penal,
because defaulting borrowers posed a higher credit risk.
Therefore, the clause had a ‘commercial justification’ and
was not simply a deterrent.
SHOULD THE RULE EXIST AT ALL?
In the course of argument in Cavendish, it was submitted that
the penalty rule lacks sufficient justification and should be
abrogated, a common theme in cases concerned with pur-
ported penalty clauses. The Court ultimately rejected these
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arguments, but we will address them, as well as a further
point about the sort of clauses that can attract the rule,
before turning to the Court’s new formulation of the rule.
Lord Hodge identified the main arguments against the
rule, at [256]–[260]. First, the rule is contrary to freedom of
contract, and it applies regardless of whether there is an
inequality of bargaining power between the parties. The
doctrine only operates on breach and can potentially be
circumvented by careful drafting. Furthermore, it promotes
uncertainty in that it is unclear how ‘exorbitant or uncon-
scionable’ a clause must be to be unenforceable. Finally, the
legislature in England has passed various statutes regulating
unfair terms in consumer contracts (as has happened in
New Zealand, see the Fair Trading Act 1986, s 26A), argu-
ably reducing the need for a rule against penalties. However,
the court declined to abrogate the rule. Lord Hodge gave
three reasons (at [261]): First, the rule protects weaker par-
ties from significant imbalances of bargaining power. Sec-
ond, abolition of the rule would go against the global trend
of decisions upholding the rule. Finally, the rule does not
prevent parties from reaching sensible arrangements to deter-
mine the consequences of breach.
WHICH CLAUSES CAN BE PENALTIES?
Cavendish resolved two questions as to the sorts of clauses
that the rule against penalties can reach. First, the rule is not
restricted to clauses that require the breaching party to pay
money (at [154] to [159]). For example, a clause that allowed
the innocent party to withhold payments could potentially be
a penalty. Second, the rule only applies to clauses that are
triggered by a breach of contract (at [41] to [42]). With
respect to this second point, the Court declined to follow the
Australian position that breach of contract is not an essential
part of the rule (see Andrews).
THE NEW ENGLISH RULE AGAINST
PENALTIES
The United Kingdom Supreme Court concluded that clauses
are not necessarily penal merely because one of their pur-
poses is to deter breach. It rejected the dichotomies that had
dominated the history of the rule, noting that clauses may
have both a primary deterrent purpose and a ‘commercial
justification’. The majority explained, at [28], that the “inno-
cent party [may have] a legitimate interest in performance
extending beyond the prospect of pecuniary compensation
flowing directly from the breach in question”. This was a key
issue on the facts of Parking Eye, as the car park operator
conceded that the £85 was not a pre-estimate of damages (at
[97]). The Court concluded that deterrence may not neces-
sarily be penal as long as there is a ‘legitimate interest’ in
performance that goes beyond the right to recover damages
for breach of contract (at [99]). Instead, the majority found,
the rule against penalties should be framed in terms of
whether the clause was “‘unconscionable’ or … ‘extrava-
gant’ by reference to some norm” (at [31]).
The majority set out the test for a penalty clause at [32]:
The true test is whether the impugned provision is a
secondary obligation which imposes a detriment on the
contract-breaker out of all proportion to any legitimate
interest of the innocent party in the enforcement of the
primary obligation. The innocent party can have no proper
interest in simply punishing the defaulter. His interest is in
performanceorinsomeappropriatealternativetoperformance.
Lord Manse found at [152] that the Court should ask:
… first, whether any (and if so what) legitimate business
interest is served and protected by the clause, and, second,
whether … the provision made for the interest is never-
theless in the circumstances extravagant, exorbitant or
unconscionable.
Lord Hodge concluded at [255] that a clause would be penal
if:
… the sum or remedy stipulated as a consequence of a
breach of contract is exorbitant or unconscionable when
regard is had to the innocent party’s interest in the perfor-
mance of the contract.
All three tests are in essence the same, in that they ground the
notion of an enforceable clause in the innocent party’s inter-
est in performance. This is because all the judges were
concernedwithpresentingabetter alternative to“thedichotomy
between the compensatory and the penal” (Lord Manse
at [152]).
Each test requires that the interests the innocent party is
seeking to protect are ‘legitimate’. While this requirement is
ambiguous without further exposition, to some extent this
ambiguity is resolved in light of the application of these tests
to the facts — all the Judges agreed that deterring breach may
be a legitimate interest in some circumstances (for example
on the Parking Eye facts), whereas “simply punishing the
defaulter” will be illegitimate (Lord Neuberger at [32]).
The reference to primary and secondary obligations in the
majority’s test ensures that a clause can only be penal if it
applies where there has been a breach of contract. Secondary
obligations are triggered on breach of contract, that is, on the
failure of a primary obligation to perform. If the parties do
not decide what damages will be payable, the content of
secondary obligations is usually determined by the courts
(Arthur Corbin “Discharge of Contracts” (1913) 22 YLJ 513
at 514).
CONCLUSION
The Cavendish decision marks a radical change in the rule
against penalties in England. Deterrent clauses are no longer
by definition unenforceable. Instead, the Court concluded
that in some cases deterring breach can be legitimate, as long
as the interest that is being protected goes beyond merely
damages for breach of contract. This is a departure from a
long line of cases where the touchstone for a penalty clause
was to ask whether the clause’s main purpose was to deter. In
light of this, Cavendish is likely to have a significant impact
in New Zealand when the rule against penalties next comes
before our courts. While punishment for punishment’s sake
is still off the table, Cavendish raises the possibility that cases
about purported penalty clauses will be argued in terms of
the strength of a party’s interest in receiving performance,
and whether the clause in question is a more appropriate
alternative to performance than a payment of compensatory
damages, rather than the traditional question of whether the
clause operates in terrorem. ❒
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